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An education in the law
may properly be described as
a f onn of moral or
senti1nental education.

by Anthony T. Kronman
The following article is an excerpt from the third of a series of
lectures entitled, "Politics, Character, and the Profession of
Law, ' ' given at the Law School last semester. The series was
sponsored by the Thomas M. Cooley Lectureship.

I

n my lecture yesterday I defined statesmanship
as excellence in deliberation about public ends and
described the statesman himself as someone with a
special sort of character as well as an intellectual skill
or expertise. The main point I shall make today is that
lawyers too have a special character, a set of
distinctive traits in many ways congruent with the
statesman' s. Because this congruence is one of disposition and desire, and not merely knowledge or
belief, its existence helps to explain why so many
lawyers are drawn to public life and why they are
in general so successful in it. The congruence is not,
of course, a perfect one - many lawyers lack either
the appetite or capacity for public life and there are,
in any case, other paths to statesmanship - but it
is close enough to justify my claim that a temperamental link exists between them, that the statesman
and lawyer resemble one another in their habits
and desires.
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hen I say that lawyers have a special
professional character, what I mean is
that they share certain affective traits acquired through their common education
and experience.
Law students do of course bring different dispositions with them: by the time someone begins the study
of law, usually around the age of 25, his or her character is already largely fixed, and to the extent this is so
the dispositional diversity that exists among people
generally will be reflected in a similar diversity among
lawyers. Nevertheless, the professional training that
lawyers receive works on these dispositions jn a regular and predictable way, strengthening some and
weakening others, altering what might be called the
affective economy of their souls. The changes that result may be marginal but they are real and enduring,
and though the process is not a mechanical one that
yields identical results in every case, it exerts a steady
pressure in a particular direction, enough so that the
traits of character to which it leads may be regarded as
a professional norm. Because it works at the level of
affect and disposition as well as the level of thought,
an education in the law may properly be described as a
form of moral or sentimental education. Those who reject this idea, maintaining that legal education involves
nothing more than the transmission of doctrinal
knowledge, will of course also deny that it makes
sense to speak, as I insist we must, of the professional
character of lawyers. The view that lawyers have such
a character cannot in fact be separated from the claim
that their professional education is in important respects a sentimental one, and it is mainly by elaborating this latter claim that I shall attempt to defend the
former one.
A lawyer's sentimental education begins in law
school and continues afterwards in practice. Of the
various traits or dispositions that it encourages there
are four that seem to me especially important. The
first is an enlarged capacity for sympathetic detachment, about which I said a great deal yesterday in
my account of the art of statesmanship. The second I
shall call "legal conscience," by which I mean a concern for the well-being of the legal order as a whole,
the kind of concern that a judge is expected to show
in deciding the controversies that are brought before
him. The third trait is an aversion to conflict coupled
with an unusually high tolerance for it and the
fourth trait is a form of conservatism: a strong
attachment to existing arrangements together with a
preference for change by small degrees.
These four traits, which overlap and reinforce one
another, represent the main elements in a lawyer's
professional character. Together they define a certain
type of human being, recognizably different from
other types and marked by a special integrity of its

own. If we had to choose a single word to describe
this type, perhaps the best we could do would be to
borrow the word the Romans used to describe the
combination of qualities they thought essential for
success in public life: the word gravitas, which perfectly expresses the cool compassion and publicspirited conservatism I have in mind.
Of the four traits that I have named, the meaning
of the first - an enlarged capacity for sympathetic
detachment - will be clearest to you from what I
have already said about it in my second lecture. It
remains for me to explain, however, how this trait is
strengthened by a professional training in the law. I
want to begin my explanation with that part of legal
education that I know best, the part that takes place
in law school and that consists in a formal program
of instruction under the supervision of nonpracticing
professors.
The single most important fact about our system
of legal education is that students are taught the law
through the study of cases. In studying these cases,

The capacity for
sympathetic detachment,
which the formal part of a
lawyer's education helps to
strengthen, must also be
regularly exercised
in practice ...
they are regularly asked to examine the controversies
embodied in them from the points of view of the
participants - judges as well as litigants - and
to assume their roles or speak on their behalf. Law
teachers differ in the ferocity with which they interrogate their students, but almost all behave in the
way I have just described, teaching the law through
cases and examining each case from a variety of
conflicting points of view.
What is the aim or function of this method of
instruction? Some defend the case method on the
grounds that it is the most economical way of teaching legal doctrine: because the cases that are taught
have generally been selected for their difficulty,
they force students immediately to confront the most
obscure and unsettled issues in an area of law, thereby giving them a quick understanding of that area's
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outer limits from which an understanding of its more
settled interior can easily be inferred. Others defend
the case method by pointing out that it trains students in those forensic skills that they will later need
in practice to represent their clients effectively. Both
of these explanations are plausible and I do not
challenge their soundness. But they leave out of
account another function of the case method which
seems to me more important still: the nurturing, in
those subjected to it, of a capacity for sympathetic
detachment.
Most students who come to law school have
strong moral and intellectual commitments but little
experience with points of view other than their own.
They know that such points of view exist, and are
generally tolerant toward them, but they have rarely
been required to entertain them in a sympathetic
way. The case method of instruction forces them to
do precisely this. When a student is asked to speak
as the advocate for a particular point of view in
a real or imaginary case, unless he declines to do
so he must make the effort to see the position he is
representing in its best possible light, to see everything favorable that can be said about it. This requires that he see the position, so far as he is able,
from within, from the perspective of the person
whose position it is, and to do this he must feel
something more than mere tolerance toward it,
he must feel, he must make himself feel, sympathy
or compassion.

t the same time, the variety of positions
he must assume and the constant
movement among them force the student repeatedly to detach himself from
the sympathetic associations he has
formed. In this way, the case method strengthens
the student's capacity for detachment as it develops
his powers of sympathy, and habituates him to the
simultaneous exercise of both. Often this leads to a
softening of the moral and political convictions with
which the student began the study of law - not to
their abandonment, but to a blurring of sharp edges,
a muting of the terms in which these convictions are
expressed, to an acknowledgment of reservations.
This is the natural consequence of an enlarged capacity for sympathetic detachment, which puts one
closer to the views of others and farther from one's
own, and the attitude to which it leads is well described by the ancient Roman motto, "humani nihil a
me alienum puto": nothing human is foreign to me.
This motto describes a certain condition of the soul,
one marked by a wide and sympathetic acquaintance
with human matters together with a cool detachment
from them. To the extent it cultivates these qualities
in a deliberate and disciplined way, the case method
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of law teaching may therefore aptly be described as a
method for training souls, or to express the same
idea differently, as a method for developing the repertoire of affective habits in which a particular form
of character consists.
The capacity for sympathetic detachment, which
the formal part of a lawyer's education helps to
strengthen, must also be regularly exercised in practice and this tends further to entrench it as a trait of
character. The role this capacity plays in the practice
of law is obscured, however, by what I shall call the
vulgar view of what lawyers do: vulgar because it reduces the whole of law practice to its least estimable
part. On the vulgar view, it is the job of lawyers
. merely to implement the ends their clients give
them. Clients are assumed, on this view, to come to
their lawyers, for advice or representation or whatever, with their ends already fixed, and it is the lawyer's task to find the most effective and least costly
way of doing what the client wants. This may require ingenuity and gamesmanship but never anything more and can therefore yield to the lawyer
only the limited satisfaction that cleverness affords.
But the vulgar view, which conceives the lawyer
to be a tool and his only skill a skill in deliberating
about means, badly misrepresents the nature of law
practice. Often clients come to their lawyers with
conflicting ends, or confused ones, or with clear but
misguided or evil ends, and when this happens it
is part of the lawyer's job to help his client discover
what he wants, or ought to want. To be sure, a
client may reject the advice his lawyer gives him
about his ends, but giving such advice is a regular
and important feature of what lawyers do - of what
they are asked and expected to do, and what they
sometimes do even when it is not asked or expected
of them. The fact that a lawyer is regularly called
upon to give advice about ends as well as means,
gives his work a dignity it would otherwise lack and
his professional judgments an independence they
could not possibly possess if they always took as
their fixed predicate the client's own clear statement
of his ends.

hat does it mean for a lawyer to advise
his client about the client's ends?
Again, the vulgar view answers in a
way that turns the lawyer into a tool
or instrument: giving advice about
ends, the proponents of this view say, is simply a
matter of supplying the client with information about
the legal consequences of the various courses of action he might undertake. Lawyers are legal experts
who know certain things their clients don't, and
according to the vulgar view, once a lawyer has told
his client what he knows about the law, the client is

perfectly capabl f making up his mind for himself.
What this verlooks, however, i the fact that the
client' problem - the problem for which he sought
the advice of a lawyer in the fir t place - may be
due not to ignorance r factual error, but to a deficiency in hi deliberative powers, to an incapacity
on the client' part to think a clearly and calmly
a he might about the problem that confronts him.
When this i the source of the client's trouble, it will
not be enough for his lawyer simply to tell him what
the law ay and what it will do to him if he chooses
one c ur e rather than another. In cases of this sort,
if he i to give his client the kind of advice he wants
and needs, a lawyer must him elf deliberate on the
client's behalf about the choice in question.
When a lawyer deliberates on his client's behalf
and offer him advice about his ends, his deliberations might be called "third personal" to distinguish them from the first personal deliberations of
one who is debating what ends to adopt for himself.
Third personal deliberation is more complex than its
first personal counterpart, but in its main features resembles it quite closely. A lawyer who is deliberating
on behalf of a client must survey the client's options
with the same sympathetic detachment he would
employ if he were deliberating on his own account.
In his imaginative elaboration of these options, the
lawyer will, of course, make use of what he knows
about the law and legal considerations will figure
prominently in his conception of them . If he is to
give the kind of advice his client needs, however, he
must also make an effort to see what is of value in
each alternative, and for this no amount of doctrinal
sophistication can ever by itself be enough. To see
the alternatives in their best light, and therefore to
give his client good advice, a lawyer also needs sympathy and detachment, the ame combination of
traits that a person mu t possess in order to deliberate well about his own ends.
The difference, of course, is that a lawyer deliberating on his client's behalf rather than his own
must first place himself imaginatively in the client's
position, for it is from this perspective, and not the
lawyer's personal point of view, that the deliberative
survey of alternatives is to be conducted. Third personal deliberation is necessarily a two-step proce ,
and it is this that gives it its pecial comp le ity. The
first step, which has no analogue in fir t personal
deliberation, consists in the imaginative adoption
of another person' in tere ts and values a one's
own, and the sec nd in a survey of various possible
course of action from the vantage point the e interests and values afford. Like the econd step, the first
one too requires the e ercise of sympathetic detachment, for unless he can combine the e oppositeseeming dispositions, a lawyer will find it difficult
to adopt his client's concern while remaining
sufficiently distant from them to offer calm advice .
There is another, even more obvious, way in
which the qualities of sympathy and detachment fig-

ure in the practice of law. The client who comes to
a lawyer often wants not just information or help in
navigating the complexities of the legal system, but
a champion, someone who will take his side and
be, as Charles Fried has said, a kind of friend . The
lawyer is not, of course, a full-fledged friend, for
friends usually make one another' end their own
with less reservation than a lawyer may be said to
embrace the ends of his client, and in any case true
friends rarely ask to be paid for their acts of friendship. A lawyer must, in fact, work to maintain the
distinction between his own ends and those of his
client, to preserve a studious detachment from his
client's concerns, for it is only this unfriendly attitude of distance that makes it morally and emotionally possible for him to represent people whose
values are different from, and often in conflict
with, his own.
At the same time, however, if he is to be a champion - something his client wants and usually deserves, and which the ethics of his profession urge
him to be - he must work to sustain a spirit of
sympathy in his relations with those whom he
represents, whether he happens to like them or not.
It is of course difficult to do this, to be a qualified
kind of friend, while holding the most intimate concerns of one's client at arms' length, but this is just
what lawyers are routinely required to do in their
professional lives. The tension to which they are
subject in their efforts to accommodate these conflicting requirements can be intense, and only a fixed
habit of sympathetic detachment gives the lawyer
who possesses it the ability to survive this tension
over the course of a whole career, and perhaps even
to make of it the occasion for a moral achievement of
his own.~
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